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Abstract
Elite universities in the United States aim to admit the most qualified and
competent students (meritocratic recruitment), but also prioritize admitting
children of alumni via legacy programs (nepotistic recruitment). These two
approaches to admissions are often at odds because the children of alumni might
not be the most qualified applicants. What happens when people are forced to
support an applicant who is meritocratic, nepotistic, both meritocratic and
nepotistic, or neither? To examine this question, I had participants assume the
role of an admissions counselor in an admissions committee tasked with picking
one top student to admit. I predicted that without pressure to agree on supporting
an applicant, participants would support the meritocratic applicant over the
nepotistic applicants and perceive the meritocratic applicant to be more qualified
than the nepotistic applicant. However, if there is pressure to agree to support a
particular applicant, participants would publicly support the favored applicant but
privately resent doing so. Results provided mixed support: Although pressure did
not directly influence public and private endorsement, there was an indirect of
pressure on endorsement measures via reactance. Pressure elicited the same
psychological mechanisms (reactance and informational contamination) that help
explain why people tend to favor meritocratic applicants but disfavor nepotistic
applicants. I close with discussing implications of these two recruitment methods.
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A lot of people think big business in America is a bad thing. I think it's a
really good thing. Most people in business are ethical, hard-working, good
people. And it's a meritocracy.
-Steve Jobs
The world is not a meritocracy, as much as we may like to pretend that it
is. And we have a really long way to go before we really reward people based on
their own merit.
-Malcolm Gladwell
Pressure to Support Meritocracy vs. Nepotism
When businesses recruit new employees, when schools recruit new
students, and when sports team recruit new players, recruitment practices often
focus on hiring individuals who are most competent (Petersen, Saporta, &
Seidel, 2000). Recruiting the most qualified and competent people is known as
meritocracy. Meritocratic recruitment aims recruit to the most talented group of
people from a given population to maximize competency and productivity. For
instance, Olympic teams recruit the best athletes in each country. Top
technology companies such as Google, Facebook, and Amazon actively recruit
the most qualified applicants, which in turn maximizes the productivity of those
companies (Tobak, 2017).
Nonetheless, as the opening quotations denote, some people believe that
the world is meritocracy, while others do not. Given recent events that sparked
moral outrage such as the 2019 college admissions bribery scandal (Kates,
2019), which involved cheating in standardized tests (Hartocollis & Engelmayer,
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2019) and faking extra-curricular credentials (Levitz & Korn, 2019), it is important
to understand how people perceive meritocracy and nepotism as recruitment
methods in elite U.S. universities. In this project, I will examine how participants
perceive a university applicant’s competency when an authority figure forces the
participant to support the applicant. In doing so, I will examine how the
psychology of forced consensus influences how people perceive the competency
of meritocratic and non-meritocratic applicants.
Below, I first discuss the merits and drawbacks of meritocracy and
nepotism, the possible conflict between meritocracy and nepotism, predicted
outcomes of what will likely happen if one is forced to support a meritocratic or
nepotistic applicant, followed by two psychological mechanisms of forced
consensus. In particular, I discuss how a forced consensus may work to instill
public agreement, but how reactance and informational contamination may
undermine its effectiveness for private agreement.
Meritocracy and Nepotism
Since meritocratic organizations bring together the most capable
individuals and finding the best person can be highly rewarding for both the
organization and the individual, competition to join meritocratic organizations is
sure to follow (Ledgerwood, Mandisodza, Jost, & Pohl, 2011). Individuals who
know they are not the most qualified for the position may compensate by
increasing their competency. But they may also use methods that in one way or
another circumvents meritocracy. They may use blatant disingenuous methods,
such as trying to appear more competent than they are (e.g. exaggerating their
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resume). Alternatively, persons may use personal connections of some kind to
land a job or gain admissions to a university, even if their skills would suggest
they are not qualified.
One form this reliance on personal connections takes is nepotism.
Nepotism is the practice of favoring those in one’s in-group (e.g. family members)
above other factors (Firfiray, Cruz, Neacsu, & Gomez-Mejia, 2018). Nepotism
occurs in universities (e.g., legacy programs), in the workplace (e.g., family
businesses), in Hollywood, and also in politics (Robertson-Snape, 1999; Fanning,
Howard, & O’Boyle, 2010).
In the current research, we examine the conflict between meritocracy vs.
nepotism in the context of admissions to elite universities in the United
States. While elite universities aspire to recruit the best and brightest students,
they also consistently recruit children of alumni (i.e., legacy programs) who may
not be the most qualified applicants (Nisen, 2013). Although supporters of
meritocratic recruitment argue against these legacy programs because being
related to alumni provides applicants an unfair advantage, those who support
nepotistic recruitment argue that legacy programs instill continuity as alumni will
actively stay involved with the university, provide networking opportunities, and
that children of alumni are often highly successful.
As this paper explores key factors that make people more or less likely to
endorse meritocratic or nepotistic applicants, I will first discuss common reasons
why each system is endorsed, as well as pertinent issues with each system.
The Benefits and Drawbacks of Meritocracy
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In theory, meritocracy maximizes competency and garners the most talent
and quality. The top business firms, law firms, and technology firms hire the most
competent employees to keep themselves ahead of their competition. Elite
universities aim to recruit the most competent students so their graduating
classes would perform well in the “real world”.
Generally speaking, meritocracy is the default method in hiring/admission
practices because it recruits the best possible applicants and presumably
provides the organization with the most gain (Littler, 2018). However, meritocracy
faces a handful of crucial issues that may reduce its effectiveness (Littler, 2018).
Hiring via meritocracy can 1) be tedious and costly, 2) be highly difficult to
measure, and 3) assume talent and intelligence are innate (see Heine, 2018, for
a discussion).
These issues in meritocracy apply in the context of admissions to elite
university programs, which often draw in thousands of applications every year.
Since each application contains many components (i.e. Grade point average,
standardized test scores, recommendation letters, personal statements, etc.),
going through every application thoroughly consumes thousands of hours that
admission committees might not have. As such, admission committees often
narrow down the application pool via arbitrary cut-off scores of some given
quantitative values such as percentiles in grade point average and standardized
test scores (e.g., GRE, MCAT, LSAT, GMAT). This practice indeed narrows
down the applicant pool, but the cut-off scores often assume that standardized
tests accurately measure intelligence. However, this is not necessarily the case;
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even the most robust standardized tests, such as Raven’s Progressive Matrices,
are entangled in culture and biased against some groups of people (Nisbett,
2009; Heine, 2018).
Even if we assume standardized test scores genuinely capture
intelligence, cut-off scores may overlook vital non-cognitive measures and
unrealized talent that could predict high performance in university contexts.
Applicants who have subpar SAT scores may have personality traits that predict
strong performance in university. High trait conscientiousness, for instance, is
associated with high GPA scores (Noftle & Robins, 2007). Conscientiousness is
overlooked in standardized tests but is instead conveyed via other means such
as recommendation letters or personal statements. Yet, the value of noncognitive measures conveyed via recommendation letters and personal
statements face the issue of a ceiling effect (i.e. recommendation letters almost
always praise the student) or manipulation (e.g. personal statements can be
written by a group of people that exaggerates the student’s achievements and
appropriate fit for the university program).
Lastly, meritocracy assumes that talent and intelligence are innate which,
in turn, can create arbitrary social divisions by implying that people who are born
intelligent are fit for success while those born with subpar intelligence are not
(Haier, 2017). Indeed, merit-based beliefs open doors for prejudice against the
less educated (Kuppens et al., 2018), and priming merit-based beliefs can lead
people to justify inequality due to perceived differences in talent (McCoy & Major,
2007). But not all talent is necessarily inherited as the heritability of talent and IQ
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can be highly variable (Heine, 2018). IQ heritability could be lower in wealthier
populations partly because children who live in rich environments have access
opportunities for intellectual engagement, whereas children who live in poor
environments could face more fluctuation as to how much their environments
provide intellectual development (Nisbett, 2009; Heine, 2018). Nonetheless,
there are people who believe that intelligence is innate and that genetic
predispositions can play a role in excluding certain groups from the meritocracy
pool.
The Benefits and Drawbacks of Nepotism
While recruiting via meritocracy aims to maximize competency, recruiting
via nepotism prioritizes in-group members, particularly family members (Riggio &
Saggi, 2015). While in Western contexts “nepotism” has a negative valence,
there are in fact many arguments both for and against nepotism. On one hand,
opponents of nepotism argue that placing family members ahead of the
competition is unfair because prioritizing one’s family could potentially exclude
more competent people who are in the outgroup. Those born in a family with
meaningful connections may be given more opportunities without considering
one’s ability. As such, people often believe that when nepotism is involved, the
beneficiary of nepotism is unqualified (Padgett & Morris, 2005).
In the context of elite universities, nepotism favors children of alumni,
professors, or those with authority (e.g. Deans). Research has found that
nepotism occurs in U.S. universities at substantial rates (Golden, 2003), the
probability of admitting a legacy student in many selective U.S. universities can
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be at least three times greater than admitting a non-legacy student (Espenshade,
Chung, & Walling, 2004; Hurwitz 2011), and that legacy students do, on average,
have lower GPAs than students admitted via meritocratic means (Massey &
Mooney, 2007). Because of these findings, students who get admitted via legacy
programs may be perceived as having unwarranted and undeserved acceptance
to a top school.
On the other hand, proponents of nepotism argue that people understand
in-group members (i.e. family members or close friends) well and having a
preexisting relationship is highly beneficial when it comes to working together.
Indeed, some research suggests that merit-based recruitment in sports teams
can, after a certain point, hinder team performance due to the lack of intrateam
coordination (Swaab, et al., 2014). This suggests that despite the potential
drawback of compromising talent, recruiting from within the family (or other
ingroups) can increase coordination if viewpoints and beliefs are aligned. Trust,
for instance, is often a competitive advantage within family businesses because
employers can assume loyalty, and by extension, a lower likelihood of betrayal
from their fellow family employees (Sundaramurthy, 2008).
What Influences the Psychology of Meritocratic vs. Nepotistic Applicants?
Meritocracy and nepotism are often at odds since someone familiar (e.g.
close friend or family member) is not necessarily the most competent. Recruiting
via meritocracy and nepotism is an issue that has been debated for years
(Espenshade & Chung, 2005) and this debate stems from the perceived
unfairness of nepotism. Specifically, nepotism is thought to be unfair when the
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person chosen for the position is not qualified or not competent, thereby going
against the goal of meritocracy. Notably, nepotism can occur without the
presence of the ingroup connection. Simply knowing that someone is favored
because of one’s connections is sufficient to elicit perceptions of nepotistic
favoritism and unfairness (Padgett & Morris, 2005). That being said, admitting
children of those who graduated or currently work in a university might not recruit
the most qualified students, but it does strengthen ties between the family and
the university.
On an individual level, those who believe in school meritocracy will be
reluctant to support a nepotistic applicant, and may even refuse when pressured
to do so. Conversely, those who do not believe in school meritocracy will be
more accepting of supporting a nepotistic applicant (Wiederkehr, Bonnot, KrauthGruber, & Darnon, 2015). In this study, a scale to measure belief in school
meritocracy (Wiederkehr et al., 2015) was included to use as a moderator for
auxiliary analyses.
On a broader level, people tend to value meritocracy over nepotism
overall, but value nepotism higher an in-group is involved. Given the differential
pros and cons of meritocracy and nepotism, it is worth considering when are
people more or less likely to support merit-based versus nepotistic-based
applicants? What factors influence people’s support for meritocratic applicants?
And to what degree might people perceive others' competence differently if they
discover nepotism is involved?
Enforced Consensus: Implications for Top-Down Agreement
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What happens when a group of people feel forced to support an
applicant? Research on the psychology of forced consensus shows that when
there is public pressure to agree (i.e. top-down pressure), it works in the shortterm publicly but can create divisiveness privately and ultimately backfire. In
other words, leaving no room for negotiation works on the surface, but does not
reflect a genuine consensus (and is often recognized as such by observers). For
instance, Conway and Schaller (2005) had participants imagine they were in an
important committee tasked with making a decision for a company. Notably,
there was either pressure by the president to agree or there was not. Results
show that when participants believed the whole committee was pressured to
agree, this pressure for agreement backfired and they were less likely to support
the President’s decision. Participants who were not pressured, however, were
more likely to agree with the President. In another study (Conway et al., 2009),
participants were asked to write about a fraternity, but a member of the fraternity
was either present or absent. Because participants were pressured to
communicate positively about the fraternity when the member was present (as
opposed to absent), participants publicly praised the fraternity in that context but
spoke negatively about the fraternity in a different context. These two studies
suggest that public pressure for agreement, which was intended to create a
consensus, can ironically backfire and cause deviance instead. In the short-term,
pressure for agreement can create artificial consensus; but in the long-term, it
tends to backfire.
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Why does forced consensus backfire? Mediation analyses suggest that
the backfiring occurs due to both reactance (emotional component) and
informational contamination (cognitive component; see Conway & Schaller, 2005;
Conway et al., 2009; Conway et al., 2017; Conway & Repke, 2019). When
people’s freedom is threatened or removed, reactance occurs and people are
motivated to restore their freedom by acting against the perceived pressure
(Silvia, 2006). Examples of reactance include controlling parenting (e.g., the use
of coercion and punishment), which backfires as it often causes children to want
more autonomy. Similarly, movie ratings that limit adolescents from viewing adult
movies backfire, as those movie ratings attract adolescents to these movies
because of reactance (Varava & Quick, 2015). Thus, in line with prior research
on forced consensus, when participants were forced to agree with the President
or to speak highly of the fraternity, part of the backfiring occurs because they
want to do the opposite to reassert their freedom (Conway & Schaller, 2005;
Conway et al., 2009).
Apart from reactance, informational contamination also explains why
forced consensus backfires (Conway & Schaller, 2005; Conway et al., 2009;
Conway et al., 2017; Conway & Repke, 2019). The context behind how
information is communicated influences how we evaluate the veracity of other’s
opinions (Newtson & Czerlinsky, 1974), such that the information presented is
discounted if the audience perceives the information as inauthentic, believe the
consensus is artificially created, or that the consensus is reflective of some
political agenda (Conway et al., 2017). As an example, consumers of science
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may find research conducted by liberals specious if it seems reflective of some
leftist agenda (see Chan et al., 2018). For example, conservatives tend to ignore
or downplay research that suggests that disruptive patterns of climate change
are due to human activity (see Campbell & Kay, 2014) and awareness of topdown pressures can cause people on both sides of the political spectrum to
oppose ecologically-friendly policies they might otherwise have supported
(Conway & Repke, 2019). In contrast, liberals may deny psychology research
findings that go against their core values (e.g. egalitarianism, social justice) if
they think the scientific findings (e.g. findings from evolutionary psychology) can
be used for political agendas against their interests (Chan et al., 2018). It may be
for these reasons that, at a large level, data reveals that governmental
autocracies interfere with the connection between cultural variables such as
collectivism and the laws that govern society (Chan & Conway, 2018).
Taken together, both reactance and informational contamination help
explain the irony in perceived pressures; metaphorically bludgeoning people with
psychological force often works in the short term but fails in the long term.
Because of this, pressure to agree should be used cautiously because of the
potentially backfiring and divisive effects. One way to think of pressure is like a
potent drug that successfully eradicates a disease but brings about aversive
long-term side effects.
This has two related consequences directly related to applicants for a
university. (1) Pressure to support an applicant by powerful sources may cause
short-term public agreement, but this consensus crumbles in the long-term
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because it creates private disagreement. (2) Nepotistic applicants in general may
cause a feeling of forced consensus, which might make them especially prone to
backfiring effects.
Forced Consensus and Support for College Applicants: Eliciting Reactance
and Informational Contamination
Specifically how might the psychology of forced consensus affect support
for nepotistic versus meritocratic applicants? While reactance and informational
contamination are both elicited through forced consensus and they often predict
similar backfiring effects, the two components differ quite significantly as well
(see Chan & Conway, under review; Conway et al., 2017).
Informational Contamination
Informational contamination occurs when an emerging or existing
consensus is perceived to be artificial or fake. As such, informational
contamination will likely be elicited when the consensus seems to be constructed
by any top-down pressure (such as an authority figure’s command) instead of
reflecting the genuine beliefs of the persons comprising the consensus. All else
being equal, perceiving that a consensus exists (e.g., the consensus for a
committee to admit an applicant) will make other people believe that consensus
is good or right (e.g., Conway et al., 2005; Conway et al., 2009; Conway et al.,
2017; Conway & Repke, 2019). Informational contamination is the process by
which that belief in the “goodness” of the consensus is eroded. Since
informational contamination only occurs when group consensus is present (and
does not operate for private communications directed only at an individual),
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participants may publicly support an applicant when pressured to, but that same
pressure may cause them to privately perceive the applicant as incompetent
because they discount the emerging consensus as artificial.
While many are under the impression that students who attend a top
school are admitted through stellar qualifications, students who are admitted via
personal connections are often thought to be unfit because the image of
meritocracy is contaminated: people will discount any consensus related to
meritocracy when nepotism is also involved, as evidenced by the college
admissions bribery scandal. Indeed, it is likely for this reason that students
admitted via legacy programs may avoid divulging how they got the position
(Harris, 2012). Thus, awareness that an applicant was admitted due to nepotism
may create informational contamination of any emergent consensus. And this
may be especially so if an authority figure in a university (e.g. President, provost,
dean, department chair) wants to recruit his or her child into the same university
and specifically orders people to accept that student. Pointing out the nepotistic
connection may privately backfire (even if it causes public compliance) because
the admissions staff may think the admissions “consensus” only reflects the
nepotistic order and not the child’s competence.
Reactance
While both reactance and informational contamination can operate on a
group level, reactance can occur regardless of what the group believes in.
Individuals should experience reactance when they are forced to support any
applicant, regardless if the applicant is meritocratic or nepotistic. When people
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are forced to support any applicant, they may – even if they still publicly support
the applicant – privately refuse to reassert their freedom. As such, pressure to
publicly support any applicant should elicit reactance, which in turn decreases
private endorsement of that applicant.
Informational Contamination Versus Reactance in Admissions
Given these differences between reactance and informational
contamination, pressure to support any applicant should elicit reactance
regardless of what the group believes in because one’s choice to support (or not
support) the applicant is taken away. By extension, no pressure to agree would
likely result in no reactance. As such, nepotism by itself does not elicit reactance
when there is no pressure to support that applicant.
Like reactance, informational contamination will also be affected by
pressure. However, unlike reactance, informational contamination should be
elicited when the group supports a nepotistic applicant (as opposed to supporting
a meritocratic applicant). Nepotistic applicants elicit informational contamination,
which in turn drives down public and private support for the applicant when there
is no pressure. This is because individual admission counselors presumably want
to recruit the most qualified applicants, so seeing the group support an applicant
that is not the most qualified contaminates this goal. This contamination is
exacerbated if there is explicit pressure to support a nepotistic applicant. When
there is pressure, people would publicly support the nepotistic applicant, but
privately resent doing so.

MERITOCRACY VS. NEPOTISM

15

When there is top-down pressure to support a nepotistic applicant, the
consensus will likely be perceived as inauthentic and elicit informational
contamination on a group level. This top-down pressure also elicits reactance on
an individual level as one’s freedom to support the applicant is removed.
Consequently, both informational contamination and reactance would push
participants to publicly endorse the nepotistic applicant because of the pressure
to agree, but privately not support the applicant.
The Current Research
Previous research has found that a third party (i.e. someone who does not
know the applicant) would likely to support meritocracy over nepotism as the
default method of recruitment. However, no research has, to my knowledge,
examined how forced consensus affects the perception of meritocratic and
nepotistic applicants. Specifically, no research has experimentally tested if
explicit pressure to support a nepotistic applicant may backfire. This study aims
to fill that gap by examining the potential irony where people want to recruit their
family or friends, but pressuring others to do so may backfire. Thus, it may be
wise for those who want to recruit a family member to withhold pressure.
In the present study, we examine how participants – taking the role as an
admissions counselor on an admissions committee that decides which students
to admit to an elite university in the U.S. – perceive four types of applicants:
meritocratic, nepotistic, both meritocratic and nepotistic, and neither meritocratic
or nepotistic. Each participant will be randomly assigned to one of four types of
applicants. Further, we manipulate whether participants are pressured to support

MERITOCRACY VS. NEPOTISM

16

the applicant, and measure if this pressure backfires via reactance and
informational contamination.
Hypotheses
Since I expect a different pattern of results for public and private
endorsement measures, I discuss hypotheses for public and private
endorsement of the applicant separately.
Hypotheses Related to Public Endorsement.
H1: There will be a main effect of pressure to support the President’s
favorite applicant, such that it increases public endorsement.
H2: There will be a nepotism x pressure interaction on public
endorsement, such that nepotism increases public endorsement if there is
pressure, but shows a weaker effect if there is no pressure.
Hypotheses Related to Private Endorsement Ratings
H3: There will be a main effect of pressure to support the President’s
favorite applicant, such that it decreases private endorsement ratings.
H3a: Pressure to support an applicant will decrease private endorsement
(H3) indirectly via reactance for all applicants.
H3b. Pressure to support an applicant will decrease private endorsement
ratings (H3) indirectly via information contamination, but only for nepotistic
applicants.
H4: There will be a main effect of nepotism on private endorsement
ratings, such that nepotistic applicant decrease private endorsement ratings.
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H5: There will be a nepotism x pressure interaction on private
endorsement ratings, such that nepotistic applicants decrease private
endorsement ratings, but this drop will be larger when there is pressure.
Method
Power Estimation
Based on prior research on the use of pressure to create an artificial
consensus (Conway & Schaller, 2005; Conway et al., 2009; Conway et al.,
2017), we expect moderate effect sizes. Power analyses revealed that an N of
126 was required for a projected moderate effect size of f2 = .25 and power = .80.
Participants
205 U.S. participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. We
opted for Mechanical Turk because of previous validation as a representative
sample for research relevant to politics (see e.g., Clifford, Jewell, & Waggoner,
2015; Conway, Houck, Gornick, & Repke, 2017; Conway & McFarland, in press)
and because it generally shows similar results as other samples (see, for
example, Conway et al., 2017; Houck, Conway, & Repke, 2014). We excluded 31
participants because they did not read the vignettes for at least ten seconds,
leaving a total of 174 participants.1 Despite this reduced sample, there were
robust effects. Participants ranged from 18 to 69 years old (M = 38.9, SD =
11.8). Gender distribution was fairly evenly split (54.2% male, 45.8% female).
Independent Variables

1

A timer was attached to all eight vignettes on the Qualtrics survey that is linked to Mechanical Turk,
which allowed me to see how long each participant read each vignette. Participants did not see this timer.
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Each participant read a scenario modeled after previous work on
pressured agreement in other domains (Chan & Conway, under review; Conway
& Schaller, 2005; Conway et al., 2009; Conway & Repke, 2019). In these
scenarios, they were asked to imagine themselves as an admissions staff who
works in an admissions committee at an elite university tasked with choosing
a ‘Presidential scholar' – one incoming first-year student who will have all tuition
and expenses waived. The scenarios varied on three variables.
Pressure to Support Applicant Manipulation. The President of the
university either tells the admissions committee who his favorite applicant is and
pressures the committee to support the applicant chosen by the President, or the
President simply ‘checks in’ on how the committee is doing and tells the
committee how the Presidential Scholar is chosen is entirely up to the committee.
In this No Pressure condition, he tells the committee he has no favorite applicant
and leaves the room. In both conditions, after some deliberation, other members
of the committee agree on a chosen applicant.
Meritocratic Manipulation. The applicant is depicted as either being
highly qualified or relatively average.
Nepotistic Manipulation. The applicant is depicted as either being the
child of the President or another typical student.
All eight versions of the scenarios in this 2 (Pressure) X 2 (Meritocracy) X
2 (Nepotism) design are listed in Appendix A. All vignettes are approximately
equal in length and each participant will be randomly assigned to read one
version.

MERITOCRACY VS. NEPOTISM

19

Dependent Measures
After participants read their assigned vignette, they were asked to
complete the following measures in this order.
Public Endorsement. Public endorsement was measured with the
following item adapted from prior work (Conway et al., 2009; 2017): “In the
scenario, if I had to publicly voice my opinion of applicant A out loud to everyone
on the admissions committee, I would publicly endorse this
applicant.” Participants responded on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 =
strongly agree).
Private Endorsement. Private endorsement was measured with the
following items adapted from prior work (Conway et al., 2009; 2017). The items
read “In the scenario, if my opinions about applicant A were kept only to myself, I
would privately endorse applicant A” and “In the scenario, I privately believe that
applicant A is highly competent and deserves to be the Presidential scholar – no
matter what I might say publicly.” Participants responded on a 7-point scale (1 =
strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). This scale demonstrated high reliability, α
= .87.
Proposed Mediators
Informational Contamination. Participants completed a 3-item scale that
measures their informational contamination in the context of the scenario
(adapted from Conway & Schaller, 2005; Conway et al., 2009; Conway & Repke,
2019). Items were “In the scenario, I believe that support for applicant A is part of
a scheme to help the applicant overcome the strenuous admission process”
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and “In the scenario, I would distrust support for applicant A because I assume it
is reflective of some agenda” and “In the scenario, I would distrust admission
procedures created by the President because I assume it is reflective of some
agenda.” Participants responded on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 =
strongly agree). This scale demonstrated high reliability, α = .84.
Reactance. Participants completed a 3-item scale that measures their
reactance in the context of the scenario (adapted from Conway et al., 2005;
Conway et al., 2009; Conway et al., 2017). Items were “In the scenario, I felt that
there was pressure to support applicant A, and that aggravated me” and “In the
scenario, I felt that there was pressure to support applicant A, which makes me
want to not support the applicant” and “In the scenario, expressed support for
applicant A makes me feel as if I should not support applicant A – just to show
that I have the right to make up my own mind.” Participants responded on a 5point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). This scale demonstrated
high reliability, α = .83.
Proposed Moderator
Belief in school meritocracy scale. Participants completed an 8-item
belief in merit scale (Wiederkehr et al., 2015). Sample items were “At school,
students who obtain poor grades are those who have not worked enough” and
“at school, students who obtain good grades are those who have worked hard.”
Participants responded on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly
agree). This scale demonstrated high reliability, α = .86. The full scale is in
Appendix B.
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Perceived Scenario Realism
Since this is a scenario study, we included two items that asked
participants how real can they imagine the scenario as a proxy for internal
validity. Items were “how realistic do you believe the scenario you just read about
college admissions was?” (1 = not realistic at all, 9 = very realistic) and “In your
own life, how close do you think the scenarios are to your own real-life
experiences that you either have had or would be likely to have?” (1 = not close
at all, 9 = very close). This scale demonstrated adequate reliability, α = .70.
Results
Primary Analyses
Separate 2 (Pressure to agree: yes vs. no) x 2 (Meritocratic: yes vs. no) x
2 (Nepotistic: yes vs. no) factorial ANOVAs were conducted to examine the effect
of the IVs on our two dependent measures: public endorsement and private
endorsement.
In terms of public endorsement, there was a main effect of
meritocracy, F(1,165) = 43.98, p < .001, ɳp2 = .21. Meritocracy increased public
endorsement (meritocracy M = 5.35 vs. no meritocracy M = 3.62). There was
also a main effect of nepotism, F(1,165) = 9.11, p = .003, ɳp2 = .05; descriptive
results indicated that nepotism decreased public endorsement (nepotistic M =
4.09 vs. not nepotistic M = 4.85). Inconsistent with H1, there was no main effect
of pressure, F(1,165) = 1.60, p = .21, ɳp2 = .01 (pressure M = 4.36 vs. no
pressure M = 4.60). Inconsistent with H2, there was no pressure x nepotism
interaction, F(1,165) = 1.52, p = .22, ɳp2 = 01. No other interactions reached
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significance. Figure 1 displays the means for public endorsement.
For private endorsement, there similarly was a main effect of
meritocracy, F(1, 166) = 110.17, p < .001, ɳp2 = .40. As expected, meritocracy
increased private endorsement (meritocracy M = 5.28 vs. no meritocracy M =
2.87). Consistent with H4, there was also a main effect of nepotism, F(1,166) =
19.28, p < .001, ɳp2 = .10; descriptive results indicated that nepotism decreased
private endorsement (nepotistic M = 3.56 vs. not nepotistic M = 4.55).
Inconsistent with H3, there was no main effect of pressure, F(1,166) = 1.50, p =
.23, ɳp2 = .01 (pressure M = 4.00 vs. no pressure M = 4.12). Inconsistent with
H5, there was no nepotism x pressure interaction, F(1,166) = .02, p = .903, ɳp2 =
.00. No other main effects or interactions reached significance. Figure 2 displays
the means for private endorsement.
As suggested above, no main effects or interactions occurred for the
pressure manipulation on both dependent variables.
Mean Patterns for Mediators
Although reactance and informational contamination were quite strongly
correlated (r = .64, p < .001), it was expected that reactance and informational
contamination would differentially affect meritocratic and nepotistic applicants. As
such, separate 2 (Pressure to agree: yes vs. no) x 2 (Meritocratic: yes vs. no) x 2
(Nepotistic: yes vs. no) factorial ANOVAs were conducted with reactance and
informational contamination as the DVs.
In line with our predictions, there was a main effect of pressure on
reactance, F(1, 166) = 28.24, p < .001, ɳp2 = .15, such that increased pressure
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led to increased reactance. There was main effect of meritocracy, F(1, 166) =
31.30, p < .001, ɳp2 = .16, such that meritocracy decreased reactance. There
was a main effect of nepotism, F(1, 166) = 24.17, p < .001, ɳp2 = .13, such that
nepotism increased reactance. Notably, these main effects were qualified by a
pressure x meritocracy interaction, F(1, 166) = .5.06, p = .026, ɳp2 = .03, that
showed although pressure increased reactance, this effect was weaker when the
applicant was meritocratic. Additionally, there was a weak but significant
meritocracy x nepotism interaction, F(1, 166) =. 4.20, p = .042, ɳp2 = .03,
whereby applicants high in meritocracy showed a weak relationship between
reactance and nepotism, but applicants low in meritocracy showed a strong
relationship between reactance and nepotism. No other interactions reached
significance. Figure 3 displays the means for reactance.
Also consistent with predictions, when informational contamination was
the DV, there was main effect of meritocracy, F(1, 166) = 40.53, p < .001, ɳp2 =
.20, such that meritocracy decreased informational contamination. There was
also a main effect of nepotism, F(1, 166) = 11.28, p = .001, ɳp2 = .06, such that
nepotism increased informational contamination. No other main effects or
interactions reached significance. Figure 4 displays the means for informational
contamination.
The effect sizes reported are consistent or even larger when compared to
prior work that examined the psychology of forced consensus. For instance,
Conway et al. (2017) reported ɳp2 = .16 for reactance, and Conway et al. (2009)
reported ɳp2 = .02 for informational contamination.
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Mediational Analyses
To examine the hypothesized X→M→Y paths where the mediating
variables are reactance and informational contamination, I followed
recommended current practices for testing indirect effects. Specifically, I used the
PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2018; model 4) to compute both normal tests of
indirect effects and bootstrapped confidence intervals (using 5000 samples) for
each X → Y indirect effect with reactance or informational contamination as the
mediator variable. In total, twelve separate mediation analyses were conducted
to examine the effect of the three IVs (X) on the two DVs (Y) via two mediator
variables (M). Importantly, the lack of direct X → Y relationships do not invalidate
indirect effects (Darlington & Hayes, 2017). It is possible that pressure did not
directly influence endorsement, but did elicit reactance that leads to decreased
endorsement – both publicly and privately.
H3a was tested by examining indirect effects of pressure on public and
private endorsement via reactance. As predicted, pressure significantly increased
reactance, which in turn significantly decreased both public endorsement
(indirect effect p < .05) and private endorsement (indirect effect p < .05). H3b
was tested by examining indirect effects of pressure on public and private
endorsement via informational contamination (additional analyses excluded nonnepotistic applicants; n = 88). Contrary to predictions, there were no significant
indirect effects between pressure and public endorsement (p = .50), and
pressure and private endorsement (p = .49)
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Additional mediation analyses revealed that reactance partially mediated
the effect of meritocracy on both public endorsement (indirect effect = .24, p’s <
.05) and private endorsement (indirect effect = .36, p’s < .05). Likewise,
reactance partially mediated the effect of nepotism on both public endorsement
(indirect effect = -.30, p’s < .05) and private endorsement (indirect effect = -.44,
p’s < .05).
Similarly, informational contamination partially mediated the effect of
meritocracy on both public endorsement (indirect effect = .55, p’s < .05) and
private endorsement (indirect effect = .56, p’s < .05). Informational contamination
also partially mediated the effect of nepotism on both public endorsement
(indirect effect = -.36, p’s < .05) and private endorsement (indirect effect = -.42,
p’s < .05). Tables 1 and 2 reports all mediation analyses.
Moderation Analyses
To analyze whether our effects are stronger for participants high in belief
in school meritocracy, moderation analyses were conducted. I followed standard
current practices for testing the moderating effect of a continuous variable on the
relationship between two other continuous variables via simultaneous regression
(Hayes, 2018). Specifically, I used the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2018; model 1)
to examine if pressure and outcome variables (public endorsement and private
endorsement) were altered at different levels of belief in school meritocracy.
Results revealed null effects, suggesting that our manipulations did not
differentially impact those high or low in belief in school meritocracy.
Scenario Realism
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Overall, participants rated the scenario to be moderately realistic (M =
5.51, SD = 1.93). The key patterns and results were essentially identical, both
descriptively and inferentially, when analyses were conducted on only
participants who reported above the midpoint on scenario realism (4.5 on a 1-9
scale; n = 130).
Discussion
As a whole, the results provided mixed support of our hypotheses.
Contrary to predictions, the pressure manipulation did not directly (but did
indirectly, through reactance) impact public or private endorsement. Below, I
discuss some of the key interpretational difficulties posed by these data, as well
as implications for these results.
Why Public and Private Endorsement Showed Similar Patterns
I expected private and public endorsement to show different patterns, but
this did not occur. Why? Part of the reason might have to do with how pressure
affected endorsement for the President’s favorite applicant. As a whole (i.e.
collapsing across different types of applicants), the presence of reactance
suggests that pressure did affect the participant at an individual level, but the
relative lack of informational contamination suggests that pressure did not – from
the participants’ eyes - influence the committee as a whole. As a result,
participants may be less influenced by pressure because the committee was also
not influenced the President’s command. Consequently, participants were not
compelled to display a different behavior under pressure because others seem to
resist said pressure. Failing to comply with the President’s command did not
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seem as threatening. This in turn induced participants to endorse the applicants
– publicly and privately – in a similar pattern.
Why Pressure Manipulation Showed No Effects: Cognitive Dissonance
Theory
Alternatively, the pressure manipulation yielded no direct effects possibly
because of cognitive dissonance, which refers to an uncomfortable state of mind
that arises when one’s actions and beliefs are not aligned (Festinger & Carlsmith,
1959). Past research has found that westerners are motivated to align their
actions and beliefs because of high individualism and the desire to have a
consistent self-concept across various contexts (Heine & Lehman, 1997;
McLeod, 2008). In this case, participants may experience cognitive dissonance
when the applicant they are forced to support (i.e. action) is not aligned with their
views on the meritocracy and nepotism (i.e. belief).
There is good reason to suggest that the participants’ beliefs of
meritocracy and nepotism were highly ingrained in their western cultural
worldview. Since meritocracy is a core feature of the American Dream, whereby
high status reflects hard work and individual merit (McCoy & Major, 2007; Fiske,
2011), people who value meritocracy associate high status with hard work.
Therefore, it would be unfair for people to have high status without putting in the
effort, as reflected in some cases of nepotism.
Given these perceptions, pressure to support a non-meritocratic applicant
may fail because of cognitive dissonance (i.e. when actions and beliefs do not
align). That is, supporting non-meritocratic applicants (action) directly goes
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against the meritocratic ideal (belief). To align this discrepancy in one’s action
and belief, participants either alter their actions to align with the belief (i.e.
support the meritocratic applicant regardless of pressure) or alter their beliefs to
align with the action (i.e. support the non-meritocratic applicant because of
pressure and tacitly forgo the meritocratic ideal). Our data suggests that
participants largely opted for the former option: they supported the meritocratic
applicant and rejected the non-meritocratic applicant, even when forcefully urged
to do otherwise.
Despite the lack of pressure manipulation working, theoretically
meaningful indirect effects of X→Y via M can occur even without direct X→Y
relationships. As predicted, pressure did elicit reactance, the same psychological
mechanism behind why (as we shall see below) people support meritocracy and
oppose nepotism.
Effects of Reactance and Informational Contamination
Pressure manipulation aside, meritocracy was associated with low
reactance and low informational contamination. As predicted, low scores on
these two variables led to increased endorsement ratings. In contrast, nepotism
was associated with high reactance and high informational contamination. As
expected, high scores on these two variables led to decreased endorsement
ratings. These findings can be explained by the significant indirect effects of
meritocracy and nepotism on both public and private endorsement. But what do
these indirect relationships, mediated by reactance and informational
contamination, suggest on a practical level?
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The Tension Between Meritocracy and Nepotism
There are many legitimate benefits of meritocracy (Ledgerwood et al.,
2011). Indeed, meritocracy has been shown to increase motivation and hard
work and is often rightfully attributed to success and honesty (Dahlström,
Lapuente, & Teorell, 2012; Egeberg, Gornitzka, & Trondol, 2017). As such,
people may be less susceptible to reactance when supporting a meritocratic
applicant since they were presumably going to support that applicant anyway.
Additionally, participants likely experience little informational contamination when
supporting a meritocratic applicant because meritocracy provides little, if any,
cues of some ulterior agenda that discounts the admission committee’s
consensus. As a result, participants reported high endorsement (both public and
private) for the meritocratic applicant.
In contrast, a nepotistic applicant elicits reactance because participants do
not want to support someone not worthy of being the Presidential scholar.
Indeed, it is possible that nepotistic applicants elicit implicit pressure because
there might be negative consequences for not supporting the beneficiary of
nepotism. This form of implied pressure also elicits reactance, as participants’
freedom to support (or not support) the applicant is implicitly removed.
Participants also experience informational contamination because it does not
seem fair to support an applicant who has connections but no merit. Thus, it
comes as no surprise that the committee’s unanimous support for the nepotistic
applicant led participants to perceive the support to be reflective of some agenda.
As a result, people reported low endorsement (both public and private) for the
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nepotistic applicant.
Taken together, people seem to publicly and privately disfavor nepotistic
applicants regardless of pressure. As such, people should be aware that
nepotistic hiring comes with psychological baggage of reactance and
informational contamination. This could theoretically put many people in a tricky
spot. People often want to recruit their close ones into their own workplace (e.g.
organization, teams, or schools) and fully believe that their close ones are a great
fit for the position, but doing so can backfire if others know about the connection.
Yet, concealing the connection can also backfire in the long term since it can be
perceived as hiding a conflict of interest. One way to solve this issue is to have
recruiters (which may include the authority figure) convince people in the
organization that the nepotistic applicant was hired not solely due to the
connection; the recruiting process was the same for everyone including nepotistic
applicant and the connection was merely a means for getting one’s ‘foot in the
door’. Another related way is to highlight nepotistic applicants’ merit to offset
reactance and informational contamination elicited by nepotism.
Limitations of the Present Work
Like all studies, certain limitations exist in our study. First, we used
hypothetical scenarios that asks people to imagine being in an admissions
committee and how they felt if they are pressured (or not pressured) to support a
particular type of applicant. Though scenario studies are commonly-used for
research and have many advantages (e.g., Conway et al., 2005; 2009; Conway
& Repke, 2019), picturing a scenario is nonetheless different than the reality of
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that scenario. That being said, this study’s sample as a whole rated the realism
of the scenario to be above average (i.e. above 4.5 on a 1-9 scale), which
suggests that they could imagine the scenario relatively well. Secondly, our
approach to meritocracy and nepotism was rather simple. We opted for a clearcut ‘yes vs. no’ paradigm and only offered participants the choice between
applicant A or applicant B for the purposes of experimental manipulation. In
reality, an admissions committee may have to narrow down among dozens of
finalists without a clear indication of which applicant is the most meritocratic, and
there may also be multiple nepotistic applicants. Thirdly, we cannot confidently
say that our results would hold across multiple recruitment contexts. This study
utilized a U.S. sample, so these effects would not necessarily occur in the same
manner in other countries. Further, group dynamics of every admission
committee can be highly complex and variations in status and power can
influence who gets recruited. Finally, the independent variable of ‘pressure’ did
not work: It had no direct statistically-significant impact on participant public and
private endorsement. Pressure was captured in the vignette when the authority
figure “forcefully urges the committee to support his chosen applicant” and can
be interpreted as too abstract (i.e. no concrete threats or consequences were laid
out), such that participants were not compelled to publicly endorse the
President’s favorite applicant. Alternatively, it is plausible that pressure did not
make a difference because of the engrained perceptions of meritocratic and
nepotistic applicants.
Future Directions
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This study revealed tensions between meritocratic and nepotistic
recruitment methods. But there are other approaches to recruitment. Namely,
universities (or other entities that recruit) may recruit to increase
underrepresented groups (i.e. affirmative action, diversity programs), recruit
people with certain skillsets not commonly associated with meritocracy (e.g.
student athletes), or even intentionally recruit those with minimal qualifications
and experience (e.g. summer internships). These recruitment methods each
have their own benefits and drawbacks, so future research could shed light on
the tensions between these recruitment methods. It is likely that reactance and
informational contamination will be elicited, but these psychological mechanisms
should theoretically operate differently within each recruitment method.
Additionally, future research could examine what occurs when there is
pressure to oppose a specific type of applicant. For instance, pressure (from an
authority figure) to oppose a meritocratic applicant may, unlike pressure to
support, elicit both reactance and informational contamination, since the
participant would like to support the meritocratic applicant and seeing the
committee oppose the most qualified applicant may be reflective of some
agenda. In contrast, pressure to oppose a nepotistic applicant may, unlike the
current study, yield little reactance or informational contamination.
Concluding Remarks
Although the present results do not draw a direct relationship between
pressure and endorsement, pressure indirectly elicits reactance, the same
mechanism that is partly responsible for why people tend to favor meritocratic
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applicants but disfavor nepotistic applicants. There may be good reason for
nepotistic recruitment, but it comes with the psychological baggage of reactance
and informational contamination.
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Table 1
The impact of reactance: Simple and indirect effects of pressure, meritocracy, and
nepotism on public endorsement and private endorsement
________________________________________________________________________
Indirect Effect Via Reactance
_______________________________________________
Simple
Indirect
Indirect
Indirect
Effect
Effect
Lower CI
Upper CI
________________________________________________________________________
Pressure/Public Endorse

.14

-.37*

.16

.70

Pressure/Private Endorse

.43

-.55*

.27

.91

1.48*

.24*

-.54

-.05

Meritocracy on private endorsement 2.06*

.36*

-.64

-.17

Meritocracy on public endorsement

Nepotism on public endorsement

-.46*

-.30*

.11

.61

Nepotism private endorsement

-.55*

-.44*

.20

.77

________________________________________________________________________
Note: N = 174 *p < .05; Confidence intervals based on 5000 bootstrapped samples.
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Table 2
The impact of informational contamination: Simple and indirect effects of pressure,
meritocracy, and nepotism on public endorsement and private endorsement
______________________________________________________________________
Indirect Effect Via Information Contamination
_______________________________________________________________________
Simple
Indirect
Indirect
Indirect
Effect
Effect
Lower CI
Upper CI
_______________________________________________________________________
Pressure/Public Endorse (whole)

-.23

-.17

-.08

-.46

Pressure/Private Endorse (whole)

-.13

-.20

-.10

-.54

Pressure/Public Endorse (half)^

-.53

-.15

-.67

-.50

Pressure/Private Endorse (half)^

-.09

-.17

-.69

-.49

Meritocracy on public endorsement

.1.18*

.55*

-.95

-.25

Meritocracy on private endorsement

1.86*

.56*

-.93

-.28

Nepotism on public endorsement

-.40*

-.36*

.11

.72

Nepotism on private endorsement

-.58*

-.42*

.14

.76

_______________________________________________________________________
Note: N = 174, ^n = 88 (analyses excluded non-nepotistic applicants) *p < .05;
Confidence intervals based on 5000 bootstrapped samples.

MERITOCRACY VS. NEPOTISM

36

Figure 1. Effect of Pressure, Meritocracy, and Nepotism on Public Endorsement.
Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
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Figure 2. Effect of Pressure, Meritocracy, and Nepotism on Private Endorsement.
Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
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Figure 3. Effect of Pressure, Meritocracy, and Nepotism on Reactance.
Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
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Figure 4. Effect of Pressure, Meritocracy, and Nepotism on Informational
Contamination. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
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Appendix A:
All Eight Vignettes
Each participant only sees 1 vignette. There are a total of 8 vignettes.
IV1: Pressure to Support (yes vs. no)
IV2: Meritocratic Applicant (yes vs. no)
IV3: Nepotistic Applicant (yes vs. no)
All vignettes have the common opening, but different endings.
Common Opening
Imagine that you are working in an elite university and you are a member of a
committee responsible for admitting incoming first-year students. This
committee includes the President of the university and ten other people from
various departments. One day, you and your committee are working with the
university President to decide who should be the next Presidential Scholar,
awarded to one phenomenal incoming first-year student who will have all
tuition and expenses waived.

Ending: Yes Pressure / Yes Meritocratic/ Yes Nepotistic
Administration has narrowed down the committee’s choices to two finalists: Applicant A
and Applicant B. At the key meeting, the President tells the entire committee that he
favors applicant A and forcefully urges the committee to support his chosen applicant.
When the final vote occurs, every single person on the committee -- all ten members -unanimously agree that applicant A should get the award. Upon additional inspection of
applicant A, you realize that applicant A is highly qualified in many respects, and that
applicant A is the child of the President. In contrast, applicant B is quite average in many
respects. It is now time to decide who should be the next Presidential Scholar.
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Ending: Yes Pressure / Yes Meritocratic / No Nepotistic
Administration has narrowed down the committee’s choices to two finalists: Applicant A
and Applicant B. At the key meeting, the President tells the entire committee that he
favors applicant A and forcefully urges the committee to support his chosen applicant.
When the final vote occurs, every single person on the committee -- all ten members -unanimously agree that applicant A should get the award. Upon additional inspection of
applicant A, you realize that the applicant is highly qualified in many respects, and that
applicant A has no previous ties to anyone in the university. In contrast, applicant B is
quite average in many respects. It is now time to decide who should be the next
Presidential Scholar.

Ending: Yes Pressure / No Meritocratic / Yes Nepotistic
Administration has narrowed down the committee’s choices to two finalists: Applicant A
and Applicant B. At the key meeting, the President tells the entire committee that he
favors applicant A and forcefully urges the committee to support his chosen applicant.
When the final vote occurs, every single person on the committee -- all ten members -unanimously agree that applicant A should get the award. Upon additional inspection of
applicant A, you realize that applicant A is quite average in many respects, and that this
applicant is the child of the President. In contrast, applicant B is highly qualified in many
respects. It is now time to decide who should be the next Presidential Scholar.

Ending: Yes Pressure / No Meritocratic / No Nepotistic
Administration has narrowed down the committee’s choices to two finalists: Applicant A
and Applicant B. At the key meeting, the President tells the entire committee that he
favors applicant A and forcefully urges the committee to support his chosen applicant.
When the final vote occurs, every single person on the committee -- all ten members -unanimously agree that applicant A should get the award. Upon additional inspection of
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applicant A, you realize that applicant A is quite average in many respects, and that
applicant A has no previous ties with anyone in the university. In contrast, applicant B is
highly qualified in many respects. It is now time to decide who should be the next
Presidential Scholar.

Ending: No Pressure / Yes Meritocratic/ Yes Nepotistic
Administration has narrowed down the committee’s choices to two finalists: Applicant A
and Applicant B. At the key meeting, the President makes it clear that everyone in the
committee has an equal say in choosing the Presidential Scholar. He tells the committee
that he has no favorite applicant, and emphasizes that to ensure that everyone can voice
their true opinions, the final vote will be anonymous so the end results could not be
traced back to individual responses. When the final vote occurs, every single person on
the committee -- all ten members -- unanimously agree that applicant A should get the
award. Upon additional inspection of this chosen applicant, you realize that applicant A
is highly qualified in many respects, and that applicant A is the child of the President. In
contrast, applicant B is quite average in many respects. It is now time to decide who
should be the next Presidential Scholar.

Ending: No Pressure / Yes Meritocratic / No Nepotistic
Administration has narrowed down the committee’s choices to two finalists: Applicant A
and Applicant B. At the key meeting, the President makes it clear that everyone in the
committee has an equal say in choosing the Presidential Scholar. He tells the committee
that he has no favorite applicant, and emphasizes that to ensure that everyone can voice
their true opinion, the final vote will be anonymous so the end results could not be traced
back to individual responses. When the final vote occurs, every single person on the
committee -- all ten members -- unanimously agree that applicant A should get the
award. Upon additional inspection of this chosen applicant, you realize that applicant A
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is highly qualified in many respects, and that applicant A has no previous ties with
anyone in the university. In contrast, applicant B is quite average in many respects. It is
now time to decide who should be the next Presidential Scholar.

Ending: No Pressure / No Meritocratic / Yes Nepotistic
Administration has narrowed down the committee’s choices to two finalists: Applicant A
and Applicant B. At the key meeting, the President makes it clear that everyone in the
committee has an equal say in choosing the Presidential Scholar. He tells the committee
that he has no favorite applicant, and emphasizes that to ensure that everyone can voice
their true opinions, the final vote will be anonymous so the end results could not be
traced back to individual responses. When the final vote occurs, every single person on
the committee -- all ten members -- unanimously agree that applicant A should get the
award. Upon additional inspection of this chosen applicant, you realize that applicant A
is quite average in many respects, and that applicant A is the child of the President. In
contrast, applicant B is highly qualified in many respects. It is now time to decide who
should be the next Presidential Scholar.

Ending: No Pressure / No Meritocratic / No Nepotistic
Administration has narrowed down the committee’s choices to two finalists: Applicant A
and Applicant B. At the key meeting, the President makes it clear that everyone in the
committee has an equal say in choosing the Presidential Scholar. He tells the committee
that he has no favorite applicant, and emphasizes that to ensure that everyone can voice
their true opinions, the final vote will be anonymous so the end results could not be
traced back to individual responses. When the final vote occurs, every single person on
the committee -- all ten members -- unanimously agree that applicant A should get the
award. Upon additional inspection of this chosen applicant, you realize that applicant A
is quite average in many respects, and that applicant A has no previous ties with anyone
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in the university. In contrast, applicant B is highly qualified in many respects. It is now
time to decide who should be the next Presidential Scholar.
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Appendix B:
Belief in School Meritocracy Scale (Wiederkehr et al., 2015).
Participants respond on a 5-point scale, 1 = strongly disagree, 5 =
strongly agree.
1. At school, when there is a will, there is a way.
2. Everyone has the same chances to succeed at school.
3. To succeed at school, one only has to work hard.
4. At school, students who obtain poor grades are those who have
not worked enough.
5. At school, students are rewarded (they obtain good grades,
praise) for their efforts.
6. At school, children obtain the grades they deserve.
7. At school, students who obtain good grades are those who
have worked hard.
8. *Willingness is not always enough to succeed at school.
(*Reverse-scored).

